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Defamation of Religions: A Vague and Overbroad 
Theory that Threatens Basic Human Rights  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (the “OIC”) 
created its “defamation of religions” theory to specifically protect 
and empower Islam. Rather than preventing defamation of any 
religion, as its name suggests, this theory actually supports Islamic 
countries’ rights to enact and enforce blasphemy, defamation, and 
incitement statutes that persecute and punish non-adherents. Since 
1999, the OIC has successfully drafted and ensured the passage of 
multiple U.N. resolutions encouraging member States to enact 
legislation prohibiting the defamation of religions. Though the 
general language has broadened over time to suggest protection for 
multiple religions, each of these resolutions has mentioned only one 
religion specifically—Islam.  
Though the motives behind the defamation of religions theory 
likely include an honest desire to prevent discriminatory treatment 
suffered by Muslims worldwide, the current doctrine is so broad that 
it poses a serious threat to the human right to freedom of expression. 
Thus, the U.N. should not encourage promulgation of defamation 
of religions legislation, but should instead work within the guidelines 
of established international law principles to encourage States to 
enforce religious rights, limit discrimination, and create an 
atmosphere of mutual respect. To accomplish this, the U.N. should 
encourage a narrower notion of incitement that balances regulation 
and even criminalization of speech or expression with robust 
discussion that sometimes shocks and offends.  
Suggestions that the international legal community merely adopt 
the U.S. First Amendment standards in related areas are overtly 
imperialistic and ignore the unique histories, cultures, and 
experiences of an international jurisdiction. Instead, the U.N. should 
encourage member States to legislate more broadly than modern 
U.S. constitutional standards and allow for some limitations on 
speech. However, such limitations must be (1) specifically intended 
to protect individuals rather than beliefs or ideas and (2) narrowly 
defined, thus preventing vague and overbroad statutes that could 
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serve as effective tools for governments to quash ideas with which 
they do not agree.  
Part II of this Comment offers a brief history of the OIC as well 
as the background of and possible motivations for the U.N. 
defamation of religions resolutions. Part III examines the history of 
defamation as a legal theory, the foundations of international human 
rights, and the question of whether the defamation of religions 
resolutions could lead to permissible limitations on the human rights 
of expression. Part IV traces the evolution of the resolutions to 
determine if and how the language has changed over time and to 
examine whether those changes infringe more or less on freedoms of 
speech and religious expression. Part V analyzes the consequences of 
the U.N.’s and the international legal community’s acceptance of 
defamation of religions as a legal theory. Finally, in Part VI, the 
Comment suggests an alternative theory that strikes a better balance 
between ensuring the right to freely hold and express opinions on 
the one hand, and individual rights to hold religious beliefs and 
freely practice religion in an atmosphere of civility and respect on the 
other. 
II. HISTORY OF AND MOTIVATIONS FOR THE OIC DEFAMATION OF 
RELIGIONS RESOLUTIONS 
The promulgation of the defamation of religions resolutions 
began with the creation of the OIC and its efforts to protect Islam 
from defamatory comments and attacks by non-adherents. The 
September 11 terrorist attacks, the ensuing violence against Muslims 
worldwide, and the publication of now infamous cartoons in a 
Danish newspaper raised the stakes on both sides of the already 
highly-charged issue. Though it is difficult to understand all the 
intricacies that motivated the OIC’s promulgation of the resolutions, 
an examination of the history of the organization and its defamation 
of religions resolutions may provide important clues.  
A. The OIC Exerts a Concerted Effort to Protect Islam 
The OIC was established in Morocco in 1969 after Zionists 
attacked the Al-Aqsa Mosque.1 Currently, its membership consists of 
 
 1. Permanent Mission of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, http://www. 
oic-un.org/about_oic.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) [hereinafter OIC Website]. 
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fifty-seven States:2 all have large Muslim populations3 and many 
proclaim Islam as the state religion.4 The goal of the OIC is to 
“safeguard the interests and secure the progress and well-being of 
their peoples and of Muslims in the world.”5 Among other things, it 
aims to “safeguard [the] dignity, independence and national rights” 
of Muslims.6 
In 1999, Pakistan, acting on behalf of the OIC, submitted a 
draft resolution dealing with defamation of religions to the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”).7 The 
resolution was sub-titled “Defamation of Islam” and it expressed 
“deep concern that Islam [was] frequently and wrongly associated 
with human rights violations and with terrorism.”8 It also expressed 
concern over increasing intolerance of Islam9 and urged States to 
pass laws to “combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of 
violence, . . . and to encourage understanding, tolerance and respect 
 
 2. Id. (listing Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, 
Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen as 
member States). 
 3. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, GLOBAL MUSLIM 
POPULATION: A REPORT ON THE SIZE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S MUSLIM 
POPULATION (2009), available at http://pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/ 
Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf (indicating that there is a Muslim majority in the 
population of forty-five of the member states and that there is still a substantial Muslim 
population (10% or higher) in those States where Muslims are in the minority, including 
Benin, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, Togo, and Uganda). Interestingly, 
there are a few States that enjoy a large Muslim majority in terms of population, but are not 
members of the OIC, including Comoros, Mayotte, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Western 
Sahara. Id.; OIC Website, supra note 1. 
 4. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN, pt. I, art. 2 (“Islam shall be the State 
religion of Pakistan.”); U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Brunei, http://www. 
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2009) (“Islam is the official 
religion.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, pt. I, art. 2, http://www. 
uam.es/otroscentros/medina/egypt/egypolcon.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (“Islam is 
the religion of the state . . .”). 
 5. OIC Website, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Pakistan, Draft Res. Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1999/L.40 
(Apr. 20, 1999). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 2. 
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in matters relating to freedom of religion or belief.”10 Finally, the 
resolution called on the U.N. to continue to monitor “attacks 
against Islam and attempts to defame it.”11 Despite the text clearly 
favoring Islam over any other religion,12 the Commission passed the 
resolution without a vote.13 A similar resolution passed in 2000,14 
again with no vote.15 The 2001 resolution—passed before the attacks 
of September 11—“not[ed] with concern that defamation of 
religions [was] among the causes of social disharmony and [led] to 
violation of the human rights of their adherents.”16 Facially, these 
early resolutions appear to be motivated by a desire to eliminate 
intimidation and coercion generally and strengthen protection for 
basic human rights. However, the resolution is quite specific in 
mentioning the poor treatment of Islam specifically. After September 
11, the self-preservation approach became even clearer.  
B. Terrorist Attacks and Danish Cartoons Raise the Stakes 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists connected with Islamic 
extremists hijacked four commercial airline jets and crashed three of 
them into iconic buildings in the United States: two crashed into the 
World Trade Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C.17 The fourth jet crashed into a rural area in 
Pennsylvania.18 Almost immediately, reports of crimes against 
Muslims and others who were mistaken for Muslims noticeably 
increased.19 In this highly charged atmosphere, the Commission 
finally called for a vote on the defamation of religions resolution. For 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. See id. passim. 
 13. CHR Res. 1999/82, at 280–81, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/167 (Apr. 30, 1999). 
 14. CHR Res. 2000/84, at 336–38, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/167 (Apr. 26, 2000). 
 15. Id. at 338. 
 16. ESCOR, supra note 7, at 2. 
 17. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade 
Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2001/09/12/AR2005033107980.html (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Hate Crime Reports up in Wake of Terrorist Attacks, CNN, Sept. 17, 2001, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.hate.crimes/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
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the first time, the resolution passed by a majority vote in favor of the 
resolution—twenty-eight States voted in favor, fifteen opposed, and 
nine abstained.20 The 2002 resolution expresses  
[a]larm[] at the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 on 
Muslim minorities and communities in some non-Muslim countries 
and the negative projection of Islam, Muslim values and traditions 
by the media, as well as at the introduction and enforcement of 
laws that specifically discriminate against and target Muslims.21 
It also “[n]otes with concern the intensification of the campaign of 
defamation of religions and the ethnic and religious profiling of 
Muslim minorities in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 
September 2001.”22 Though there are general references to 
“religion” and “religions,” indicating at least some expectation that 
religions other than Islam would be included in these new 
protections, the document specifically mentions only the Islamic 
religion as needing protection and lists offenses suffered by Islam 
generally and its adherents specifically. The Commission voted to 
pass similar resolutions in each of the subsequent four years.23 
Four years later, Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper, printed 
cartoons that portrayed Muhammad in a less than favorable light.24 
Islam forbids any graphic representations of Muhammad, and the 
cartoons—which showed images of the prophet with a bomb nestled 
in his turban and awarding virgins to martyrs—created enough 
controversy that some deemed it a global crisis.25 Interestingly, the 
violence incited by the cartoons was neither instigated by non-
adherents, nor was it directed at Islam. The reactionary death 
threats, violent acts, and subsequent casualties were mostly the result 
 
 20. CHR Res. 2001/4, at 47–48, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/167 (Apr. 18, 2001). 
 21. ESCOR, supra note 7, at 1 (emphasis omitted). 
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23.  CHR Res. 2005/3, U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.12 
(Apr. 12, 2005); CHR Res. 2004/6, at 28–31, U.N. ESCOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 13, 2004); CHR Res. 2003/4, at 34–37, U.N. ESCOR, 
59th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/135 (Apr. 14, 2003); CHR Res. 2002/9, 
at 56–59, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200 (Apr. 15, 
2002). 
 24. See, e.g., Muslim Anger at Danish Cartoons, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4361260.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 25. See, e.g., Mohammad Cartoons Global Crisis, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2006, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4690338.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
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of extremist Muslim groups reacting violently to the publication of 
the cartoons.26 In the wake of these controversial cartoons and the 
subsequent violent reactions worldwide, the General Assembly of the 
U.N. took up the issue of defamation of religions and, for the first 
time, this principle organ of the U.N. debated, voted, and passed a 
General Assembly Resolution entitled “Combating Defamation of 
Religions.”27 Considering the tenor of the times, it is no surprise that 
the resolution easily passed.28  
The cartoon controversy tightened the tension between the 
defamation resolutions and the principle of freedom of expression. 
On one side, angry Muslims demanded punishment for the insult 
they had suffered at the hands of the artists and publishers of the 
cartoons; on the other side, newspaper officials and journalists 
insisted that their right to speak their opinion could not be quashed 
merely because their views offended a religion—an idea.29 Even 
before the controversy, the United States did not support the 
defamation of religions resolutions with their narrow view favoring 
Islam.30 After the controversy, the United States better understood 
 
 26. See, e.g., Spiegel Online International, Cartoon Violence Spreads: Arson and Death 
Threats as Muhammad Caricature Controversy Escalates, SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, 
Feb. 4, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,399177,00.html (last visited Mar. 
27, 2010) (quoting a radical imam, “These drawings are a declaration of war,” and reporting 
that signs at demonstrations read, “Butcher those who mock Islam” and “Europe take some 
lessons from 9/11”); Mohammed Cartoons Global Crisis, supra note 25 (detailing global 
demonstrations in which Muslims burned buildings and flags, stormed embassies, and called 
for the fall of Denmark); Muslim Cartoon Fury Claims Lives, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4684652.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010); 
Muhammed Cartoon Row Intensifies, BBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/europe/4670370.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (detailing bomb threats to 
publishers of the cartoons and other repercussions to European newspapers who reprinted the 
original cartoons). 
 27. G.A., 60th Sess., 3d Comm., Yemen: Draft Resolution: Combating Defamation of 
Religions, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/60/L.29 (Oct. 31, 2005). 
 28. There were 101 votes in favor of the resolution, and only fifty-three opposed. 
Twenty abstained from voting. 
 29. See Are Protests over Cartoons Justified?, BBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/4678264.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (listing 
comments from across the world on both sides of the issue). 
 30. U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 3d Comm., 45th mtg. ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/60/ 
SR.45 (Nov. 21, 2005). Ms. Zach (United States of America) said that her country had been 
founded on the principle of freedom of religion. Every State must protect the right of its 
peoples to worship freely and to choose or change religions. Her delegation agreed with many 
of the general tenets of the draft resolution and deplored the denigration of religions. The 
draft resolution was incomplete, however, as it failed to address the situation of all religions. 
More inclusive language would have furthered the objective of promoting religious freedom. 
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the impact the resolutions could have on First Amendment free 
speech principles and, along with other Western States, began to 
oppose the resolutions more vigorously.31 
More recently, the OIC has used the term “Islamophobia” to 
describe the discriminatory treatment suffered by Muslims 
worldwide. This discrimination is quite real and is manifest in a 
number of settings towards a variety of Muslims. Noah Feldman 
stated that “familiar old arguments against immigrants—that they are 
criminals, that their culture makes them a bad fit, that they take jobs 
from natives—are mutating into an anti-Islamic bias that is becoming 
institutionalized in the continent’s otherwise ordinary politics.”32  
Such discriminatory bias is evident in the recent constitutional 
amendment passed by 57.5 percent of Swiss voters prohibiting the 
construction of new minarets.33 A recent report from the OIC cites 
several such examples of discrimination. For example, a Dutch survey 
indicated a majority of the population in the Netherlands agreed that 
the country should stop allowing the construction of some 
mosques.34 Additionally, a British study reporting that even after 
dismissing the articles about the 9/11 attacks in the United States 
and the July 7, 2005, bombing in London, two-thirds of newspaper 
articles about Muslims in England portrayed them as threatening and 
problematic.35 In the United States, a Gallup poll found that thirty-
 
Furthermore, any resolution on the topic must include mention of the need to change 
educational systems which promoted hatred of particular religions or state-sponsored media 
which negatively targeted any one religion or people of a certain faith. 
 31. See, e.g., Hilary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on the Release of the 2009 Annual 
Report on International Religious Freedom ¶ 5 (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/rm/2009a/10/130937.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (“[S]ome claim that the 
best way to protect the freedom of religion is to implement so-called anti-defamation policies 
that would restrict freedom of expression and the freedom of religion. I strongly disagree.”); 
Marc D. Stern, Don’t Defend Religion By Silencing Free Speech, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 
2008, at 27 (calling for more governments to join the U.S. in paying attention to and debating 
the OIC proposals); U.N. Rights Body Condemns “Defamation” of Religion, REUTERS, Mar. 
30, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/ idUSL30414112 (last visited Mar. 
27, 2010) (pointing out the difference in position between Islam States and Western States). 
 32. Noah Feldman, The Way We Live Now: The New Pariahs?, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/magazine/22wwln-lede-t.html. 
 33. See, e.g, Wikipedia, Minaret Controvery in Switzerland, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Minaret_controversy_in_Switzerland (last visted Mar. 27, 2010). 
 34. OIC, 2ND OIC OBSERVATORY REPORT ON ISLAMOPHOBIA: JUNE 2008 TO APRIL 
2009, 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.oic-un.org/document_report/Islamophobia_ 
rep_May_23_25_2009.pdf. 
 35. Id. at 10. 
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nine percent of Americans have felt some prejudice towards 
Muslims.36 The report also describes problems faced by Muslims in 
education (lack of curriculum about Islamic history and civilization), 
government (lack of knowledge of the state language), and other 
generally discriminatory practices (lack of employment, headscarf 
bans, etc.) as problems faced by Muslims regularly.37 It also lists a 
number of “Islamophobic” incidents, from incidents as relatively 
mild as op-eds against Islam to crimes as serious as personal physical 
attacks on Muslims and attacks on groups and property, such as 
congregations and mosques.38 
Certainly much of this prejudicial behavior is real. Muslims 
should have a right to peacefully believe and practice the Islamic 
religion and there are, at times, behavior and comments that make it 
difficult to do so. Again, at least facially, the OIC is motivated to 
promulgate defamation of religions as a protection against such 
behavior. There are certainly issues of prejudice here that deserve 
sensitive treatment. Nonetheless, critics assert that the defamation of 
religions movement is more about granting OIC member-states even 
more power to oppress their citizenry and to assure the preeminence 
of Islam as a state religion. Through such a lens, the OIC’s 
resolutions appear as a poorly masked method to infringe on 
individual rights of expression and religion in the name of protecting 
against defamation of religions.39  
III. DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS: A PERMISSIBLE RESTRAINT ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION?  
The theory of defamation of religions as set forth by the OIC 
takes a wide divergence from the traditional defamation doctrine. 
The essential question, considered in the framework established by 
foundational texts in international human rights law, is whether 
defamation can be narrowly applied to preserve civility and respect 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 12. 
 38. Id. at 13–14. 
 39. See, e.g., Steven Groves, Why the U.S. Should Oppose “Defamation of Religions” 
Resolutions at the United Nations, BACKGROUNDER, (Heritage Foundation), No. 2206, Nov. 
10, 2008, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/11/Why-the-US-
Should-Oppose-Defamation-of-Religions-Resolutions-at-the-United-Nations; Christopher 
Hitchens, Don’t Say a Word, SLATE, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www. slate.com/id/2212662/ 
(last visted Mar. 27, 2010). 
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for adherents of minority religions while still allowing for freedom of 
speech and religious expression. Answering that question requires a 
knowledge and comparison of the doctrine of defamation in various 
legal traditions, an understanding of the human rights enumerated in 
international instruments, and an application of the defamation of 
religions theory to the enumerated rights. 
A. History, Basic Elements, and Contemporary Usage of Defamation  
In writing about the varied history of defamation, Prosser and 
Keeton stated, “it must be confessed at the beginning that there is a 
great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It 
contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever has 
had a kind word.”40 In the middle ages, reputation was defended 
vigorously and led to defamation becoming an actionable right 
providing for recovery in the late 1500s.41 With the advent of the 
printing press and the attendant implications for an absolute 
monarchy, German and English law adopted Roman defamation 
laws directly,42 thus laying the foundation for defamation 
jurisprudence in both the civil and the common law traditions. Early 
on, defamation laws were designed to protect individuals, and 
sometimes groups, from hateful, libelous, or slanderous comments.43 
However, there is no evidence that any law has ever protected an 
idea or a collection of ideas from what may be deemed defamatory 
comments.  
The concept of defamation wound its way through both English 
common law history and the civil law history of other States. In the 
United States it eventually became a tort, but in civil law traditions it 
generally emerged as a criminal statute.44 However, several countries 
 
 40. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, 
771 (5th ed. 1984). 
 41. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. 
L. REV. 546, 546–47 (1903). 
 42. Id. at 547. 
 43. Id. at 548–49. 
 44. See, e.g., SERGE L. LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET 
CIVIL LAW 114–51 (1979) (outlining the law of defamation in the Soviet Union); Alexander 
Bruns, Access to Media Sources in Defamation Litigation in the United States and Germany, 10 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 283 (comparing actions and remedies for defamation in the United 
States with those under the German civil law). 
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are in the process of decriminalizing defamation,45 and between 
2005 and 2007 only a few countries punished five or more 
individuals for defamation by fine or imprisonment.46 Thus, 
defamation generally does not rise to the import of a crime and 
retains only limited status as a tort for which some remedy may be 
sought. Even though defamation is, in very few countries, still 
considered a serious enough infringement to warrant criminal 
penalties in some cases, it is important to understand that the basic 
elements of defamation apply to the rights of individuals to maintain 
their reputations. In rare instances where States punish defamation 
through criminal penalties, the government often uses the 
punishment neither to protect an individual’s reputation nor to 
enforce a human right to dignity, but rather to maintain autocratic 
stability and absolute government control. 
The Constitution of the United States, along with First 
Amendment jurisprudence, provides strong protection for the 
freedom speech. Accordingly, defamation in the United States has 
withered into little more than a narrowly-defined tort providing 
limited injunctive and/or monetary remedies. Contemporarily, the 
basic rule for finding liability for defamation in the United States 
requires four elements:  
 
 45. See, e.g., TOBY MENDEL, ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA DEVELOPMENT IN THE MALDIVES 
5 (2009) (explaining that defamation is a criminal offense in the Maldives but indicating that 
this is not the favorable treatment when compared with practices internationally). But see 
Article 19, Defamation Legislation Maps, http://www.article19.org/advocacy/ 
defamationmap/map (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (showing that, though a majority of 
countries have criminal defamation legislation in place, a number of those countries have 
already initiated decriminalization of defamation). 
 46. Article 19, Maps: Punishment, http://www.article19.org/advocacy/ 
defamationmap/map/?dataSet=imprisonment (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (showing that 
China, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Iran, Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Chad, and the Congo 
were the few countries punishing five or more individuals for defamation). Interestingly, three 
of those countries—China, Uzbekistan, and Iran—are on the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Countries of Particular Concern List, 
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1456&Itemid=1 (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2010), and one other—Egypt—is on the USCIRF Watch List, 
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1457&Itemid=60 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010), indicating a close correlation between countries that put more 
value on enforcing defamation statutes and enforcing defamatory language and those that have 
“ongoing, egregious violations of religion freedom,” or which “require close monitoring due 
to the nature and extent of violation of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the 
government.” Countries of Particular Concern List, supra; USCIRF Watch List, supra. 
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(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an 
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting to at 
least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either 
actionability on the statement irrespective of special harm or the 
existence of special harm caused by the publication.47  
It is worth reiterating that the statement must be false, it must be 
about another individual, and it must be in a publication that is not 
privileged. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the speaker or 
publisher of the statement acted negligently and that the publication 
or the statement resulted in harm to the plaintiff. Therefore, in the 
United States a true statement cannot be defamation, even if it is 
defamatory in nature;48 neither can a defamatory comment about a 
belief or idea be defamation per se because it is not made about a 
person.49 Once a person is held liable for defamation, U.S. courts 
may award a plaintiff actual damages only,50 meaning compensation 
for the harm the publication caused to the plaintiff’s reputation.51 
There is neither any criminal statute nor any criminal penalty for 
defamation in the United States. 
Defamation plays out differently in civil law countries. As 
mentioned above, most other countries in the world have criminal 
defamation statutes on the books, but few regularly enforce them. 
Germany has defended criminal defamation statutes, stating that they 
are needed to guarantee the right to dignity as stated in the German 
Constitution.52 However, truth is generally not a complete defense 
under the Western European defamation criminal statutes as it is in 
U.S. civil provisions.53 This indicates a stronger desire in Western 
 
 47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
 48. “A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as 
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with him.” Id. § 559. 
 49. Id. § 564 cmt. a (noting that “the recipient of the defamatory communication 
understand[s] [that the communication] refer[s] to the plaintiff”). In this case the language 
and intent of the law clearly indicates that defamation is applicable to publications in which 
statements are made regarding individuals, not thoughts, beliefs, or ideals.  
 50. Id. § 621. 
 51. Id. at cmt. a. 
 52. See Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 
48 MD. L. REV. 247, 295 (1989); GG, pt. I, art. 1, Protection of Human Dignity (1990).  
 53. Jane E. Kirtley, Criminal Defamation: An “Instrument of Destruction,” in ENDING 
THE CHILLING EFFECT: WORKING TO REPEAL CRIMINAL LIBEL AND INSULT LAWS 89–101, 
94 (Ana Karlsreiter & Hanna Vuokko eds., 2004). 
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Europe to protect an atmosphere of civility and respect and an 
increased willingness to infringe on an individual’s rights of freedom 
of speech and expression. 
An even larger gap exists between defamation as defined in the 
United States and defamation as defined in Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries. Countries such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—all members 
of the OIC—also retain criminal defamation statutes.54 Additionally, 
some of these countries actively prosecute and convict journalists 
under defamation statutes in an ostensible effort to encourage self-
censorship.55 At best, criminal defamation statutes began as “a 
peaceful alternative to the duel and other violent forms of self 
help,”56 but at worst they are “rooted in authoritarianism and 
autocracy, in intolerance of dissent, and in distrust of public opinion. 
[They] keep[] the masses in their place and under control, by 
suppressing information about rulers that might incite unrest or 
rebellion.”57  
Note that criminal defamation statutes as used in the 
aforementioned OIC member-countries have amounted to little 
more than a guise through which the state can justify intolerance and 
suppression of contrary ideas and information. It is easy to see how 
such countries—where the sovereign is used to being able to 
prosecute and terminate anti-government speech, where there is a 
substantial percentage of the population who are active adherents to 
a particular religion, and where that religion is often an official state 
religion—would justify taking the short step towards protecting that 
official religion, and from there to protecting religion generally 
through an expansion of existing defamation theories bolstered by 
the human right of freedom of religion. At first glance, the potential 
costs to freedom of expression and freedom of religion are not 
obvious; thus, defamation of religions may appear to be an 
acceptable vehicle for these countries to safeguard their ability to 
 
 54. See generally Elena Yanchukova, Criminal Defamation and Insult Laws: An 
Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-Communist Jurisdictions, 41 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861 (2003).  
 55. Kirtley, supra note 53, at 97 (citing Yanchukova, supra note 54). 
 56. MLRC Bulletin, Criminalizing Speech About Reputation: The Legacy of Criminal 
Libel in the U.S. After Sullivan and Garrison, at 1 (Mar. 2003), quoted in Kirtley, supra note 
53, at 98. 
 57. Kirtley, supra note 53, at 98. 
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silence individuals or groups with viewpoints deemed detrimental to 
the religion and the state. However, relying on the human right of 
freedom of religion to justify censorship and oppression does not 
align with the meaning or purpose of the promulgation and 
enforcement of international human rights. No “[s]tate, group or 
person [has] any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any [human right or fundamental 
freedom].”58  
B. Interaction Between Defamation of Religions and the Basic Human 
Rights Enumerated in Major International Instruments 
Establishing a universal definition of human rights has proven 
challenging. In 1948, the General Assembly of the U.N. adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).59 This 
declaration recognizes that the “foundation of freedom, justice, and 
peace in the world” are the “inherent dignities” and the “equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”60 Though 
the UDHR implicitly asserts the universality of the enumerated 
rights, some nations aver that this view reflects neither their 
traditional culture nor their religious beliefs. The foundational 
principles of the UDHR varied enough from the foundational beliefs 
of Islamic States that the OIC drafted and submitted the Cairo 
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (“the Cairo Declaration”) in 
1993.61 
The Cairo Declaration asserts many rights similar to the 
UDHR62; however, the guiding principles are clearly limited to 
providing a “dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah,”63 
and the key rights enumerated in the Cairo Declaration are “subject 
 
 58. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol No. 11, Sept. 2003. 
 59. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 60. Id.  
 61. OIC, The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Secretariat, Status of 
Preparation of Publications, Studies and Documents for the World Conference, delivered to 
the World Conference on Human Rights Preparatory Committee, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (June 9, 1993). 
 62. See, e.g., id. art. I(a) (“All human beings . . . are equal in terms of basic human 
dignity . . . .”). 
 63. Id. at 3. 
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to the Islamic Shari’ah.”64 Human rights in the Cairo Declaration are 
“an integral part of the Islamic religion” and are “binding divine 
commandments . . . contained in the Revealed Books of God 
and . . . sent through the last of His Prophets . . . thereby making 
their observance an act of worship and their neglect or violation an 
abominable sin, and accordingly every person is individually 
responsible . . . for their safeguard.”65  
Realistically, it would be impossible for any international body to 
adopt such a declaration because, by favoring Islam, it would be 
disfavoring all the other religions in the world. Therefore, where the 
Cairo Declaration enjoyed only limited support—generally from 
Islamic States—the UDHR maintained its status as the most widely 
supported declaration of human rights.66 It provides guidelines for 
an evolving international human rights jurisprudence. Addressing the 
broad-ranging and often subtle difficulties regarding cultural 
relativism and state imperialism surrounding the human rights 
debate exceeds the scope of this Comment; however, it is enough to 
recognize that there is no unanimous consensus regarding “universal 
human rights.” Since the UDHR has been adopted by a majority of 
U.N. Nation-States, it can be used as a starting point for developing 
a common ground. Through its quasi-universal lens, human rights 
are viewed as a most basic endowment of autonomy, common in one 
way or another to all humankind and deserving of the most stringent 
protection possible through legal instruments and government 
regulation. 
The UDHR declares that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion . . . and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance,”67 
and that there is a “right to freedom of opinion and expression” 
including the right to “hold opinions without interference and to 
 
 64. Id. art. 24. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. The UDHR was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948, after a 
vote resulting in forty-eight in favor, zero against, and eight abstentions. See UDHR, supra 
note 59. In contrast, the Cairo Declaration was adopted by forty-five ministers of the OIC, but 
has been generally rejected by the U.N. community. But see HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: VOLUME II: REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
(1997) (including the Cairo Declaration as the final document in this collection compiled by 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 
 67. UDHR, supra note 59, art. 18. 
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seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers.”68 Undoubtedly, there are instances in 
which one individual’s opinions might be contrary to another’s 
religious belief, a tension foreshadowed in U.S. First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Thus, the clear difficulty in attempting to protect 
against defamation of religions comes in determining where to draw 
the line between protecting individual rights to believe and practice a 
religion and individual rights to hold and express opinions—some of 
which may be offensive to certain sects.  
Additionally, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights69 (“ICCPR”) creates a nuance in the already 
tense balance between freedom to believe and practice one’s religion 
and freedom to hold and express one’s opinion. “Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of expression . . . [t]he exercise of [which] 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions . . . [f]or respect of the rights or 
reputations of others . . . .”70 Article 19 thus specifically provides for 
a limitation on free expression and gives the OIC a foundation to 
claim that its resolutions combating defamation of religions are 
nothing more than an attempt to appropriately limit the right of 
expression.71 The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression agrees 
that the ICCPR provides that there must be a limit on freedom of 
expression, but asserts that the limitations allowed by Article 19 
 
 68. Id. art. 19. 
 69. The ICCPR is a U.N. treaty designed as the legal documentation enforcing the 
UDHR and entered into force on March 23, 1976. See Audiovisual Library of International 
Law, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/iccpr/iccpr.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 70. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(2)–(3)(a) (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
Seventeen countries (including the United States) have entered declarations or reservations on 
all or part of ICCPR Article 20. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Declarations and Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20i/ 
chapter%20iv/iv-4.en.pdf (last visted Mar. 27, 2010) (listing Australia, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States as 
making declarations or reservations as to Article 20). 
 71. OIC, 2ND OIC OBSERVATORY REPORT ON ISLAMOPHOBIA: JUNE 2008 TO APRIL 
2009, 5, 15, 44 (2009), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/uploads/file/Islamophobia/ 
Islamophobia_rep_May_23_25_2009.pdf (emphasizing that the ICCPR Art. 19 provides for 
“certain restrictions” on the freedom of expression and reiterating that the U.N. General 
Assembly approves of limiting expression to protect against defamation of religions as manifest 
by the passing of defamation of religions resolutions since 1999).  
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“should be clearly and narrowly defined” so as to be the “least 
intrusive means” of limiting expression and should not be allowed to 
justify prior censorship on speech.72  
Another complication in this balancing act appears in Article 20 
of the ICCPR. “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 
shall be prohibited by law.”73 The OIC has conflated defamation of 
religions with “incitement to religious hatred” and thus has justified 
its advocacy of broadening the permissible limitations on the 
freedom of expression.74 In the OIC’s effort to secure its right to 
believe and worship without suffering offensive expressions from 
others, it presents the two doctrines of defamation of religions and 
incitement to violence as if they are the same. In fact, defamation of 
religions is a much broader category—one under which incitement 
may fall, but which still would allow for much broader regulation 
than incitement would alone. Incitement, unlike defamation of 
religions, is a specific existing legal doctrine with varied definitions 
depending on the country at issue.  
In the United States, incitement is a very narrowly enforced 
doctrine. It prohibits the government from regulating speech as 
incitement unless the speech was “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”75 The three requirements of the present-day test—intent, 
imminence, and likelihood—make it a very narrow doctrine. 
However, before promulgating the contemporary, narrow rule, the 
Court was much more lenient as to what constituted incitement.76 
This seemed particularly so in times of national stress or danger.77  
 
 72. Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶65, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/7/14 (2008). 
 73. ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 20. 
 74. OIC, supra note 61, at 14. 
 75. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 76. See, e.g., Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 
U.S. 211 (1919); Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 77. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616 (1919). 
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Internationally, incitement can be a much more serious offense 
and is often criminalized.78 Each country has various definitions of 
incitement—an exploration of which go beyond the scope of this 
Comment—but in general much of the consequential international 
law of incitement has been motivated by the desire to prevent 
massacres such as the Holocaust of World War II, the “cleansing” of 
Muslim inhabitants in Bosnia in the early 1990s, or the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994.79 This has led to broader definitions of incitement 
that allow for more regulation of expression than would be 
permissible in the United States. Generally, direct, public incitement 
is viewed more seriously than private incitement80 and there is often 
some requirement that the “incitee” have at least some intent to 
act—though the action itself does not necessarily have to be 
accomplished.81  
In this case, though, the expressions that the OIC desires to limit 
do not always rise to the level of even the broader non-U.S. 
definitions of incitement. The Danish cartoons as well as other 
expressions82 condemned by the OIC are expressions covered under 
Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR, and therefore 
should be limited only if they are shown to be “advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred [constituting] incitement to . . . violence.”83 
Though the publication of the Danish cartoons and other 
expressions labeled as defamatory by the Muslim community have 
been followed by violence, as noted above, the violence in such cases 
 
 78. See Wibke Kristin Timmermann, Incitement In International Criminal Law, 88 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 823 (2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0. 
nsf/htmlall/review-864-p823/$File/irrc_864_Timmermann.pdf (including an excellent 
discussion of the history and evolution of incitement in international law).  
 79. Timmerman, supra note 78, at 823–24. 
 80. Id. at 838–39. One example of a fairly stringent incitement law comes from the 
German Penal Code, providing that “instigators” are punishable for influencing the will of 
another to commit a criminal act—even if that person’s effort to commit the act fails. Id. at 
848. The U.N.’s Convention on Genocide prohibits “[d]irect and public incitement to 
commit genocide.” United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 3(c). 
 81. Timmerman, supra note 78, at 839 (“[T]he instigation must be causally connected 
to the substantive crime in that it must have contributed significantly to the commission of the 
latter, the instigator must act intentionally or be aware of the substantial likelihood that the 
substantive crime will be committed, and he must intend to bring about the crime 
instigated.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Life of Slain Dutch Film-Maker, BBC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3975211.stm. 
 83. ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 20. 
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was more akin to violence that would lead to a heckler’s veto84 than 
violence springing as result of incitement.  
Generally, for a statement or publication to be incitement, the 
speaker speaks to a group who then, incited by the speaker’s words, 
goes forward with the intent to commit an illegal act. In this case, 
the resultant violence was not “incitees” acting out violence against 
Muslims, rather, Muslim extremists were reacting to the offensive 
cartoons, films, or statements and attempting to silence those who 
had published and provided access to the ideas expressed. Not 
surprisingly, this campaign of violence was effective and publishers 
have shied away from printing materials that may result in a violent 
reaction from Islamic extremists.85 For example, a publisher refused 
to print a novel about one of Mohammed’s wives because of the fear 
of ensuing violence.86 Additionally, in India, a newspaper editor was 
arrested for publishing material criticizing Islam (as well as 
Christianity and Judaism) after Muslims protested the paper.87 Thus, 
the violent actions of the offended extremists have been validated 
and have had a documented “chilling effect” on the category of 
expressions at issue.  
In addition to successfully chilling expression through actions 
akin to a heckler’s veto, the OIC States have successfully played 
 
 84. “[A] ‘heckler’s veto’ is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech where 
the speech is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience.” 
16A Am. Jur. 2D Constitutional Law § 477 (2010); see, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2008); Roe v. 
Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008); Ctr for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles 
County Sherriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 85.  See, e.g., Publisher’s Statement, Author’s Statement, in JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE 
CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD, vi (2009). 
 86. See Asra Q. Nomani, You Still Can’t Write About Muhammad, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL ONLINE (Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/ 
SB121797979078815073.html. Later, the same novel was contracted to be published in the 
United Kingdom, but was dropped again after the publisher’s home was firebombed. See Jamin 
Doward & Mark Townsend, Firebomb Attack on Book Publisher, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 
2008), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/sep/28/muhammad.book.attack; 
Sarah Lyall, Attack May Be Tied to Book About Muhammad, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/world/europe/29jewel.htm?_r 
=2&oref=slogin. Ultimately, the book was published and distributed by a U.S. publisher—not 
without controversy. See Laurel Maury, ‘Jewel’ is Finally Here; Was it Worth the Wait? L.A. 
TIMES (OCT. 6, 2008), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/06/ 
entertainment/et-book6. 
 87. Jerome Taylor, Editor Arrested for ‘Outraging Muslims,’ INDEPENDENT (Feb. 12, 
2009), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/editor-arrested-for-
outraging-muslims-1607256.html. 
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defamation from two sides. On one side, they allow Islamic 
extremists to create an atmosphere of fear through violent reactions 
to actions deemed defamatory to Islam in non-member states 
without loudly decrying that behavior,88 thus encouraging a 
disposition of absolute protection for Islam. On the other side, OIC 
States have used the defamation of religions theory to persecute 
individuals and groups within their own borders for blasphemy, 
defamation, or slander of Islam—thus squelching any dissenting or 
critical discourse.89 This self-preservation approach is clearly manifest 
in the evolution of the defamation of religions resolutions from the 
U.N. 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF A RESOLUTION 
The defamation of religions resolutions have slowly changed 
since they were first introduced in 1999. Originally, they were passed 
through the U.N. commission without so much as a vote, but have 
since been voted on numerous times and now appear to be losing 
support in the General Assembly. In some cases, the changes in the 
text demonstrate an increased effort for the OIC to promote 
protection of Islam over all other religions and an effort to present 
defamation of religions as a permissible limitation of freedom of 
speech and religious expression. 
A. 1999–2000: Beginnings 
As mentioned above, the defamation of religions statute was 
passed without a vote from 1999–2001, and when the Commission 
first put it to a vote, it passed easily.90 The resolutions have 
continued to pass when voted on by the General Assembly in 2005 
and every year since.91 Though the 1999 resolution specifically 
mentions “Islam” twice, it also uses the more general term 
“religion” several times92 indicating that, although the resolution was 
sponsored by the OIC, there was certainly room for protection 
 
 88. See sources cited supra note 86. 
 89. See infra Parts V.C.1-2. 
 90. See supra Part I.A. 
 91. Supra note 27; infra notes 98, 112, 120, 125–26, 128, 135. 
 92. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Pakistan, Draft Res. Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.40 
(Apr. 20, 1999). 
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against defamation of any religion. This first resolution had just three 
recommended actions. First, it urged States to “take all necessary 
measures to combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of 
violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by religious 
intolerance.”93 Second, it “[i]nvite[d] the High Commissioner . . . 
to formalize the holding of seminars to promote a dialogue among 
cultures” in order to add to the dialogue on universal human 
rights.94 Finally, it asked that the Special Rapporteurs on religious 
intolerance and “on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance . . . take into account the provisions of the 
present resolution when reporting to the Commission” on Human 
Rights at subsequent sessions.95 The most problematic of these is the 
encouragement of state action to “take all necessary measures” to 
combat the offensive behavior constituting defamation of religions. 
This broad directive encouraged States to act appropriately “within 
their national legal framework [and] in conformity with international 
human rights instruments.”96 There was neither a specific mention of 
how those actions may engage other rights, nor was there a 
suggested boundary on the limitations that may be justified as 
appropriate to combat the offensive behavior. This set the stage for a 
very broad application of government limitations on otherwise 
protected expressions because they defame a religion. 
The 2000 resolution asserted that “discrimination based on 
religion or belief constitutes an offence to human dignity and a 
violation of human rights.”97 This was a much stronger assertion than 
anything in the earlier resolution and signaled a move towards even 
broader protections threatening more limitations on rights of 
expression. The new resolution still advocated the same three actions 
as the earlier version with no other major changes. 
B. 2001: A Pre-9/11 World 
The 2001 resolution was passed in April—before the September 
11 attacks in the United States—by a vote of twenty-eight to fifteen 
 
 93. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. at 3. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. CHR Res. 2000/84, at 336, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/167 (Apr. 26, 2000) (emphasis added). 
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with nine abstentions.98 This resolution specifically used “Islam” only 
once—perhaps in an attempt to broaden the protections for all 
religions—but, for the first time, used “defamation of religions” in 
the actual text of the resolution. First, it “not[ed] with concern that 
defamation of religions is among the causes of social disharmony and 
leads to violation of the human rights of their adherents.”99 Second, 
it asked States “to provide adequate protection against all human 
rights violations resulting from defamation of religions.”100 The use 
of the “defamation of religions” language is interesting because there 
had never been a concise definition for “defamation of religions.” 
Thus far, the resolutions had provided only an amorphous list of 
words with very little decisive meaning—intolerance, discrimination, 
violence, intimidation, coercion. From this language it was difficult 
to know whether defamation of religions was an act against a religion 
or some type of inchoate offense. If it was inchoate, there were no 
guidelines to determine what would fit the category. This vagueness 
created the opportunity for States to draft enormously broad statutes 
that could be deemed permissible limitations on expression and the 
exercise of religion based on the resolution.  
Additionally, this resolution was also the first in which the OIC 
encouraged States, within their own law and value systems, to 
“provide adequate protections against all human rights violation 
resulting from defamation of religions.”101 This goes a step further 
than the “necessary measures to combat” language in the original 
resolution suggesting that the OIC favored stronger protection 
against defamation of religions than may have been indicated earlier. 
Furthermore, the indication that preventing defamation of 
religions will protect human rights is clearly articulated for the first 
time in this resolution with the assumption that the right to be 
protected has to do with the right to hold and practice religious 
beliefs. Interestingly, there is still no mention of the potential 
conflict between creating and enforcing defamation of religions 
statutes and the right to expression.  
 
 98. CHR Res. 2001/4, at 47, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/167 (Apr. 18, 2001). 
 99. Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. 
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This version also emphasized a need for “respect for religious 
diversity”102 and added to the list of actions requested as a response 
to the resolution. Specifically, it called for joint conferences between 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and other 
organizations to inform the conversation surrounding the 
universality of human rights and requested a report from the High 
Commissioner to the Commission at a subsequent session.103 
C. 2002: Reactions to the Violent Backlash Against Muslims 
The 2002 resolution passed after the September 11 attacks and 
used the strongest language yet in favor of defining defamation of 
religions as an “affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”104 Additionally, it 
contained noticeably more references to “Islam” and “Muslim” than 
any of the earlier resolutions. Islam is mentioned three times and 
Muslim is used seven.105 What is most surprising about much of the 
language in this version is that it still emphasized prejudicial behavior 
towards Muslims only. For example, the resolution stated that the 
Commission was “[a]larmed at the impact of the events of 11 
September 2001 on Muslim minorities and communities in some 
non-Muslim countries and the negative projection of Islam, Muslim 
values and traditions by the media, as well as at the introduction and 
enforcement of laws that specifically discriminate against and target 
Muslims.”106 Clearly, the backlash against Muslims resulting from 
the attacks was real and, in many cases, prejudicial and 
discriminatory. However, the resolution made no mention of the 
prejudice and discrimination that motivated the attacks nor does it 
include language indicating that those injured in the attacks were 
also deserving of protection.  
This resolution provided another justification for the defamation 
of religions theory by calling for increased respect of all cultures in 
hopes of creating a “globalized world” and recognized that allowing 
the continuing defamation of religions was incompatible with that 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
 104. CHR Res. 2002/9, at 56, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/200 (Apr. 15, 2002). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted). 
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goal.107 Essentially, through the resolution, the OIC suggested that 
unless action was taken to provide for protection against defamation 
of religions, globalization was an impossible goal. This version also 
noted “the intensification of the campaign of defamation of 
religions,” particularly as applied to profiling of Muslims108 and 
“express[ed] deep concern at programmes and agendas pursued by 
extremist organizations and groups aimed at defamation of 
religions.”109 
Finally, this resolution called for more action than previous 
versions. It asked the “international community” to begin a dialogue 
forwarding tolerance and respect for individuals and for “religious 
diversity”; and most specifically asked the “Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance to examine the situation of Muslim and Arab 
peoples.”110 The marked increase of specific references to “Muslim” 
and “Islam” indicated an increased willingness of the OIC to assert 
the right to protection of Islam above the right of such protection 
for other beliefs and expressions of such beliefs. The 2002 resolution 
enjoyed slightly increased support over the previous resolution and 
passed by a vote of thirty to fifteen with eight abstentions.111 
D. 2003–2004: Fluctuations in Support 
The 2003 resolution specifically mentioned Islam three times 
and used “Muslim” five times, continuing the strong preferential 
treatment for Islam and its adherents that had been averred the 
previous year.112 The resolution reasserted the theses that 
“defamation of religions is among the causes of social disharmony 
and leads to violations of human rights of their adherents,”113 and 
that “defamation of religions and cultures [is incompatible] with the 
objectives of a truly globalized world and the promotion and 
maintenance of international peace and security.”114 It articulated 
 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 58. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 59. 
 111. Id. at 61. 
 112. CHR Res. 2003/4, at 34–37, U.N. ESCOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/135 (Apr. 14, 2003). 
 113. Id. at 35. 
 114. Id. 
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“deep concern [about] the intensification of the campaign of 
defamation of religions, and the ethnic and religious profiling of 
Muslim minorities, in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 
September 2001,”115 but still failed to recognize the profiling and 
other persecutions that other world religions had suffered in the 
same period.  
For the first time, this resolution “expresse[d] deep concern” 
regarding motivations and actions of “extremist organizations,” 
particularly those aided by governments, whose aim is to defame 
religions.116 This version encouraged governments to “ensure that all 
public officials . . . in the course of their official duties respect 
different religions and beliefs and do not discriminate on the 
grounds of religion or belief”117 and again requested that the Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance examine and report on physical 
assaults, and attacks on places of worship, businesses, and properties 
of Muslim and Arab people specifically.118 Thus, this resolution 
reiterated the preferential treatment for Islamic concerns and 
underscored the general acceptance of the defamation of religions 
resolutions by requesting particularized action by governments and 
officials to limit “defamation” specifically as directed towards 
Muslims. Again, this resolution had increased support and was 
adopted by a vote of thirty-two to fourteen with only seven 
abstentions.119 
The 2004 resolution recognized the report submitted by the 
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, presumably 
submitted in response to the request in the 2003 resolution.120 The 
recommendations to prevent defamation of religions in this version 
combined the “provide adequate protection” language of the 2001 
and subsequent resolutions with the “take all appropriate measures” 
language of earlier versions,121 perhaps indicating a disagreement as 
 
 115. Id. at 36. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 37.  
 119. Id. 
 120. CHR Res. 2004/6, at 28, U.N. ESCOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 13, 2004). 
 121. Id. at 30. 
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to the most appropriate language. Notably, this resolution marked 
the first decrease in support as it passed with three fewer votes than 
the previous year—twenty-nine in favor, sixteen opposed, and seven 
abstentions. The reasons for this temporary decrease are unclear and 
support for the resolution increased the following year. 
E. 2005: Intensification of a Campaign 
The 2005 resolution was noticeably longer than previous 
versions and included several additions. This version again 
demonstrated an increase of specific references to the Islamic 
religions, using “Islam” six times and “Muslim” seven times.122 This 
indicated at least a continuing effort to make the defamation of 
religions theory particularly applicable to Islam. Additionally, the 
resolution noted “the intensification of the campaign of defamation 
of religions” since September 11, 2001.123 It asserted that “in the 
context of the fight against terrorism and the reaction to counter-
terrorism measures, defamation of religions becomes an aggravating 
factor that contributes to the denial of fundamental rights and 
freedoms to target groups, as well as their economic and social 
exclusion” and emphasized “the need to effectively combat 
defamation of all religions, Islam and Muslims in particular, 
especially in human rights forums.”124 This was a clear assertion that 
the defamation resolutions had not been as effective as the OIC had 
hoped and served as a call for increased limitation on expressions that 
could be deemed defamation of religions. This version of the 
resolution serves as a clear indication that the OIC believed Islam 
deserved particularized protection from offense compared to other 
religions. The Commission adopted this version on a vote of thirty-
one to sixteen with five abstentions, indicating strong endorsement 
of these assertions that had such broad implications for human rights 
generally. 
F. 2006–2007: The Move to the General Assembly 
The 2006 resolution was the first to be adopted by the General 
Assembly, did not vary substantially from the 2005 resolution 
 
 122. CHR Res. 2005/3, U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.12 
(Apr. 12, 2005). 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. 
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adopted by the Commission, and still made frequent, obvious, 
particularized reference to Islam and Muslims as a specific religion 
and group of adherents principally deserving of protection.125 This 
resolution is important because it is the first adopted by majority 
vote by the main organ of the U.N. This brought heightened 
attention to the defamation of religions debate and encouraged 
participation by a wider swath of States regarding the issue. 
The 2007 resolution still made frequent reference to Islam and 
to Muslims, indicating that “defamatory” treatment of the religion 
and its adherents warranted special recognition and urging 
regulatory measures of such treatment. This resolution was the first 
to recognize the conflict between the defamation of religions theory 
and the right to freedom of expression.126 However, the resolution 
stated specifically that freedom of expression “should be exercised 
with responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitation as 
provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations 
of others, protection of national security or of public order, public 
health or morals and respect for religions and beliefs.”127 Furthermore, 
the resolution “[u]rge[d] States to take resolute action to prohibit” 
defamation of religions.128 The first statement recognized the conflict 
and promptly asserted that protection against defamation of religions 
is a valid justification to limit the right of expression. The second 
took the “provide adequate protection” and “all appropriate 
measures” language of earlier versions to a new level—requiring that 
States take “resolute action.” As this resolution also passed by a 
majority vote, it appeared that the main body of the U.N. accepted 
this assertion and that defamation of religions was gaining 
recognition and strength. 
G. 2008: Decreasing Margins of Support 
The 2008 resolution was substantively similar to the 2007 
version. However, the newer version asked “the Secretary-General to 
submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution, 
including on the possible correlation between defamation of 
 
 125. G.A. Res. 60/150, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/150 (Jan. 20, 2006). 
 126. Id. 
 127. G.A. Res. 61/164, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/164 (Feb. 21, 2006) 
(emphasis added). 
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
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religions and the upsurge in incitement.”129 Motivation for the 
inclusion of this request is unclear given that former resolutions and 
the resolution at issue already make the correlation between 
defamation of religions and incitement/intolerance. Perhaps the 
OIC was attempting to strengthen the link between the relatively 
new theory of defamation of religions and the already established 
laws regarding incitement. In linking the two theories, the OIC may 
have been attempting to lend credibility to the defamation ideas, 
thereby facilitating increased acceptance of the theory internationally. 
Notably, this version was not adopted by a majority, but by a 
plurality vote—twenty-one in favor, ten opposed, and fourteen 
abstentions—indicating a slight but noteworthy decrease of support 
that may have led to changes in subsequent resolutions.130 
H. 2009: Current Resolution and Recommendations for Application 
The 2009 resolution had noticeably fewer references to Islam.131 
It was considerably longer than previous versions—seven pages 
rather than two, three, or four—and for the first time made repeated 
references to “incitement to religious hatred.”132 It mentioned an 
“overall campaign of defamation of religions, and incitement to 
religious hatred in general” before specifically mentioning the 
“ethnic and religious profiling of Muslim minorities.”133 The 
resolution “deplore[d] all acts of psychological and physical violence 
and assaults, and incitement thereto, against persons on the basis of 
their religion or belief.”134 This broader language concerning the 
religions and beliefs implicated indicated a willingness to afford 
protection to more than just Islamic beliefs. This is important 
because the question of defamation may arise between opposing 
religions and the broader language removes the weight favoring 
protection specifically for Islam.135 It also added the language “enact 
 
 129. G.A. Res. 62/154, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/62/154 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 130. Id. 
 131. G.A. Res. 63/171, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/63/171 (Mar. 24, 2009). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. For example, a Muslim may claim that the witness of a Christian is offensive because 
it asserts that Muhammad was not a prophet, that Christ is the Messiah, and that an individual 
can only be “saved” through faith in Christ. In this case, the Christian’s exercise of a basic 
right of freedom of belief and practice runs in direct opposition to the core beliefs of the 
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the necessary legislation” to the stated obligation for state action 
indicating strong encouragement to pass statutes regulating behavior 
that may be deemed defamation of religions.136 
Late in 2009, Belarus, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela 
submitted a draft resolution that was subsequently approved by the 
General Assembly.137 This most recent draft specifically mentions 
“Islam” or “Muslim” only three times and adds recognition of “the 
valuable contributions of all religions and beliefs to modern 
civilization and the contribution that dialogue among civilizations 
can make to an improved awareness and understanding of common 
values.”138 This language is encouraging as it recognizes some value 
in all religious beliefs and encourages improved awareness and 
understanding among varied beliefs.  
This resolution also adds an assertion that defamation of 
religions “give[s] rise to polarization and disturb[s] social cohesion” 
and introduces a recognition of “the importance of the interface 
between religion and race, and that instances of multiple or 
aggravated forms of discrimination can arise on the basis of religion 
and other grounds such as race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin.”139 This assertion may inspire stronger support for the 
prevention of defamation of religions as it perhaps appropriately 
conflates defamation ideals with those of racial or ethnic 
discrimination. Certainly, the right to believe and practice a religion 
is deserving of strict protections, similar to the strict restrictions on 
racial or ethnic discrimination. But discrimination is a different 
animal than defamation in that discrimination usually requires a 
showing of some sort of treatment or exclusion based primarily on 
the stated classification. On the other hand, defamation can be much 
more broadly interpreted such that another person’s ideas or mere 
expression that may be offensive to adherents of a particular religion 
can be limited. This does not require a showing of unfair treatment 
or exclusion, merely an assertion that the expression offended and 
thus should be prohibited. This broad theory applied with the same 
 
Muslim. Earlier resolutions emphasizing protection for Islam over other religions may provide 
support for countries embracing Islam as a state religion to prohibit any such actions deemed 
offensive to Islam. 
 136. G.A. Res., 63/171, supra note 131. 
 137. G.A. Res., 64/PV.65, 64th Sess., U.N. Doc A/Res/64/156 (Dec. 18, 2009). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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force as protections designed to prevent racial or ethnic 
discrimination would most certainly infringe on individual rights of 
expression. 
This most recent General Assembly Resolution passed with 
eighty votes in favor, sixty-one votes opposed, and forty-two 
abstentions, indicating that support for the resolution continues to 
wane.140 This version advocates for protection against defamation of 
religions generally, but still makes special mention only of Islam, 
stating that it is a religion that “is frequently and wrongly associated 
with human rights violations and terrorism.”141 It also condemns 
“racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and all other forms of 
related intolerance;”142 and it again urges member States to enact 
legislation to “provide . . . adequate protection against acts of 
hatred, discrimination, intimidation and coercion resulting from the 
defamation of religions, and incitement to religious hatred in 
general.”143 
There continues to be debate about what this actually means and 
how States can enforce laws meant to prevent giving offense to what 
amounts to a collection of ideas and beliefs.144 The most recent 
report and recommendations of the Special Rapporteur to the U.N. 
Human Rights Council (the “Council”) discuss this conceptual 
difficulty and advise that the Council move away from the 
“sociological notion of the defamation of religions” and instead 
embrace the “human rights concept of incitement to racial and 
 
 140. G.A./10905, 64th Sess., General Assembly Adopts 56 Resolutions, 9 Decisions 
Recommended by Third Committee, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 
2009/ga10905.doc.htm. 
 141. G.A. 64th Sess., 3d Comm., Belarus, Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela: Draft 
Resolution: Combating Defamation of Religions, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/64/L.27 (Oct. 29, 
2009) ¶ 7. 
 142. Id. ¶ 12. 
 143. Id. ¶ 15. 
 144. See, e.g., John Cerone, Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist 
Resolutions, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 357 (2008) (illustrating the two extreme positions and 
asserting that the corpus of international law provides a sufficient framework to understand and 
find a balance between the interests); Joshua Foster, Prophets, Cartoons, and Legal Norms: 
Rethinking the United Nations Defamation of Religion Provisions, 48 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 
19 (2009) (contending that the U.N.’s approach is overly paternalistic and infringes on free 
speech principles); L. Bennett Graham, Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?, 23 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 69 (2009) (asserting that the defamation of religions solution is 
problematic because it inhibits the protection of other fundamental freedoms). 
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religious hatred.”145 The Special Rapporteur also notes this approach 
would lead towards the necessary balance between freedom of 
expression and the need to eliminate hate speech.146  
Interestingly, this approach shifts the focus from a general 
protection against defamation of religions towards an individualized 
protection against discrimination, incitement, and hate speech. It 
leans towards curbing undesirable words and actions against another 
person rather than against beliefs and provides slightly more 
preferential treatment for the right to hold and express autonomous 
opinions than would be provided by a strong anti-defamation 
approach.  
Over time, the resolutions on the defamation of religions have 
broadened to include all religions within their circle of proposed 
protection, but continue to specifically mention only Islam—setting 
it up as the one set of beliefs that is in particular need of such 
protections. The resolutions have asked state governments and 
international bodies to provide protection against defamation of 
religions in increasingly robust terms. Finally, they have made 
increasingly vigorous connections between defamation of religions 
and other more strictly prohibited expressions that are generally 
more narrowly defined such as incitement and racial discrimination. 
Though some changes are encouraging—e.g., the inclusion of all 
religions as worthy of protection—others present concern about the 
enactment and enforcement of statutes designed to follow the 
defamation of religious principles and recommendations. An 
examination of such statutes and their enforcement in OIC member 
and non-member states exemplifies such concerns. 
V. CONSEQUENCES OF ACCEPTING THE RESOLUTIONS AND 
SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF STATUTES DESIGNED TO PREVENT 
DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS 
Broad acceptance of the Defamation of Religions Resolutions 
will contribute to the enactment and enforcement of overbroad, 
 
 145. Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action, ¶ 5, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/38 
(July 1, 2009) [hereinafter S.R. Report 2009]. 
 146. Id. ¶ 19. 
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vague laws that may appear to protect religious interests, but actually 
infringe impermissibly on individual rights of freedom of expression 
and freedom of religion. Below are examples of laws and rulings in 
State courts that follow the doctrinal basis of the defamation of 
religions resolutions. The degree to which such a theory can infringe 
on the basic human rights of freedom of speech and expression are 
clearly illustrated in the following examples, including international 
adjudications as well as statutes and adjudications in OIC member 
and non-member states.  
A. Human Rights Committee 
The Human Rights Committee (the “Committee”) is a body of 
experts charged with monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR 
by State parties.147 The Committee is also the successor to the body 
that initially approved the defamation of religions resolutions, and it 
tends to fall on the side of stricter protection against defamation. It 
has the authority to clarify articles of the ICCPR by issuing general 
comments and by hearing and deciding cases brought under the 
articles of the ICCPR. The cases brought pursuant to Article 20 
reinforce the idea that the ICCPR provides broad discretion to limit 
an individual’s freedom of expression because of the possibility of 
offending another’s religious beliefs.  
1. J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada 
In J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada, the Committee held that 
anti-Semitic views were expressions subject to limitation under 
Article 20 when the leader of an unincorporated political party 
created messages designed to “warn . . . ‘of the dangers of 
international finance and international Jewry leading the world into 
wars, unemployment and inflation and the collapse of world values 
and principles’” that were accessible by telephone to persons who 
dialed a specific number.148 The court’s reasoning was limited and 
provided almost no instruction on how to determine where to draw 
 
 147. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human 
Rights Committee Website, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ (last visited Mar. 
27, 2010). 
 148. J.R.T. and the W.G. Party v. Canada, CCPR/C/18/D/104/1981, Human Rights 
Committee (1981), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/104-
1981.htm. 
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the line between freedom of expression and the responsibility not to 
discriminate. 
2. Faurisson v. France 
Nearly ten years after J.R.T., the Committee upheld a conviction 
under French law for contesting the history of the Holocaust and 
held the conviction was not a violation of the ICCPR where a 
university professor questioned the existence of extermination gas 
chambers in Nazi concentration camps149 even though the professor 
claimed he had suffered ridicule, death threats, and personal attacks, 
and asserted that the act under which he was prosecuted and 
convicted150 posed “a threat to freedom of research and freedom of 
expression.”151 In this case, the Committee considered the issue 
through a broad social context, giving deference to the French 
government’s assertion that challenging the truth of the Holocaust 
was a “principal vehicle for anti-semitism.”152 Thus, the court found 
the limitation necessary under Article 19 because the government 
acted to prevent what it had determined constituted discrimination 
towards a particular group. 
B. The European Court of Human Rights 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (“the 
Court”) are not binding internationally beyond the forty-seven 
member states that have ratified the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights (“ECHR”). However, it is a court with 
international influence and its decisions provide some of the most 
persuasive authority available in analyzing the implications of parallel 
international instruments such as the ICCPR. John Cerone asserts 
that jurisprudence arising under Article 10 of ECHR has provided 
“the most extensive freedom of expression jurisprudence.”153 The 
 
 149. Faurisson v. France, Commc’n No. 550/1993, U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/ 
550/1993 (1996).  
 150. The Act in question is titled the “Gayssot Act” and “makes it an offence to contest 
the existence of the category of crimes against humanity . . . on the basis of which Nazi leaders 
were tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945-1946.” 
Id. ¶ 2.4. 
 151. Id. ¶ 2.5. 
 152. Id. ¶ 9.7. 
 153. Cerone, supra note 144, at 363 (analyzing in detail the cases and trends towards 
increasing limitations on expression as justified by defamation of religions principles). 
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Court is charged with interpretation of the ECHR and Cerone has 
identified two separate analyses with which the court has examined 
limitations on expression. The first relies on Article 17 of the ECHR 
and applies to a narrow factual application. The second relies on the 
limitations clause of Article 10 and is applied more broadly. 
1. Limitations of expressions under Article 17 
Article 17 is an abuse of rights provision of the ECHR and 
states: 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the Convention.154 
Though it is difficult to get facts to fit this vague language, Cerone 
identified three factors the Court has considered when examining 
limitations on expressions specifically involving challenges to the 
validity of the Holocaust. Though these factors are likely fact-
specific, they give some insight into the Court’s treatment of 
defamation issues. 
First, the expression being limited must be “one of the most 
serious forms of incitement to hatred of Jewish people.”155 Second, 
the expression must infringe on the rights of others.156 Finally, the 
expression must be a “serious threat to public order.”157 Cerone 
notes that these factors have been strictly limited to cases involving a 
denial of the Holocaust because of the “significance of the 
Holocaust in European history.”158 He further notes that the Court 
otherwise accords a lofty status to Article 10, holding that “freedom 
 
 154. European Convention on Human Rights art. 17, Nov. 4, 1950, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 165 
[hereinafter ECHR]. 
 155. Cerone, supra note 144, at 364. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of 
racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this 
type of historical fact undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-
Semitism are based and constitutes a serious threat to public order. Such acts are incompatible 
with democracy and human rights because they infringe the right of others. Their proponents 
indisputably have designs that fall into the category of aims prohibited by Article 17 of the 
Convention. Id. at 364–65 n.47 (citing Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 397). 
 158. Id. at 365. 
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of expression . . . constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress 
and for each individual’s self-fulfillment.”159 
2. Limitations of expression under Article 10 
When examining limitations on expression that are not denials of 
the Holocaust, the Court’s analysis stays more closely aligned with 
the limitations clause of Article 10,160 which states: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.161 
The standard analysis the Court uses in examining limitations on 
expressions under Article 10 consists of two basic parts.162 First, the 
Court asks whether there has been an interference with freedom of 
expression as stated in Article 10(1).163 Then, if there is interference, 
the Court determines whether the interference is permissible.164 A 
limitation is permissible only if it is “prescribed by law, [or is] one of 
the enumerated aims [of Article 10], and [is] necessary to a 
democratic society.”165 In applying this test, the Court has not drawn 
a hard line between categories of what is an acceptable limitation and 
what is not, but it prefers to balance several factors on a case by case 
basis.166 Notably, when the expression is one of core speech such as 
political speech, the category of permissible limitation will be 
 
 159. Id. (quoting Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1986)). 
 160. Id.  
 161. ECHR, supra note 154, art. 10(2). 
 162. Cerone, supra note 144, at 366. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (citing Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355; Jersild v. Denmark, 
298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986)). 
 166. Id. (citing Sürek, 1999-IV Eur Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 24–25; Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25). 
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narrowed.167 Conversely, if the expression incites violence, the 
category of permissible limitations will be broadened.168 
Ultimately, the Court has created a confusing and unpredictable 
jurisprudence that nonetheless gives preferential treatment to 
protecting religious sensibilities and provides some support for the 
defamations of religions theory. Cerone points out that in 
Kokkinakis v. Greece, the Court held that a State may legitimately 
limit conduct “judged incompatible with respect for the freedom of 
thought conscience, and religion of others.”169 Additionally, in Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria the Court held that seizure of a film by 
a State may be a permissible limitation on expression when the State 
has found that the film is an attack on religion.170 Otto-Preminger 
provided the OIC with a strong precedent favoring implementation 
of defamation of religions principles. There, the court articulated a 
new “right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings” 
through the expressions of others.171 The court has tied this right to 
the right of religious freedom, but it has clearly stated that those 
exercising their freedom of religion cannot expect to be free from 
criticism; rather, believers should be prepared to “tolerate and accept 
the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the 
propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith.”172 This, it 
would seem, is the heart of religious freedom—inherent in the 
acceptance that each is free to believe and to exercise that belief is 
the acceptance that the beliefs of some will conflict with the beliefs 
of others. It follows that individual rights, such as freedom of 
expression, should be limited only to the extent absolutely necessary 
to prevent infringement on others’ fundamental rights.  
Unfortunately, the international adjudicatory precedents on 
permissible limitations of expression are unclear and leave little surety 
as to which expressions are allowed and which will be limited. 
Perhaps more problematic is the lack of clarity as to why expressions 
may be limited or protected and the Court’s apparent willingness to 
show a great amount of deference to the State even when it limits 
 
 167. See id. at 367. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 369 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20 (1993)). 
 170. Id. (citing Otto-Perminger Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 17–18 
(1994)). 
 171. Id. (quoting Otto-Perminger, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 18) (emphasis added)). 
 172. Id. at 371 (quoting Otto-Perminger, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 17–18)). 
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the expression of individuals who do not subscribe to majoritarian 
beliefs in their respective countries. For example, in more recent 
decisions, the Court has upheld a ban of a film deemed blasphemous 
and offensive to Christians by the British government, and it found a 
Turkish criminal blasphemy statute consistent with Article 10.173 
Cerone points out that in the continuing expansion of permissible 
limitations, the Court “may have lost its sense of the balance 
between [freedom of expression and freedom of religion].”174 
Though these precedents lend ample support to the theory 
behind the defamation of religions resolutions, there is a danger in 
allowing a broadening of acceptable limitations in relation to the 
injured feelings of groups of adherents to particular religions. In 
continuing to accept these precedents and encouraging a broad 
category of limitations on freedom of expression, the human rights 
framework would be undermined by claims of offense from even 
majoritarian groups exercising their right to have their religious 
feelings insulated from injury. And thus majority groups could then 
oppress and discriminate against minority groups—even when those 
minority groups may be exercising their own religious beliefs 
through various expressive means like teaching, witnessing, or 
sharing their beliefs with others.  
C. Blasphemy, Incitement, and Hate Speech Laws and Their 
Enforcement  
Currently, a number of States prevent defamation of religions 
through blasphemy, incitement, or hate speech laws. Though not 
labeled as defamation statutes, these laws protect interests parallel to 
those that the OIC seeks to protect through promulgation of the 
defamation of religions theory, and they act as a sanctioned 
 
 173. Id. at 370–71 (citing Wingrove v. U.K. 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1960; I.A. v. Turkey, 
App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)). 
 174. Id. at 372. Cerone illustrates that the Court appears to be allowing limitations on 
expression when there has been no showing as to how those expressions limit or infringe on 
any specific right of another person. Additionally, the Court has failed to establish a clear link 
between its articulation of protection of religious feelings and the right to freedom of religion. 
Moreover, he notes that protection for religious feelings seems more appropriate when applied 
to vulnerable minorities rather than to majorities that may use defamation or blasphemy to 
keep the minority in check. Finally, Cerone notes that an inherent problem with blasphemy 
laws—often created and maintained as a protection of religious feelings—is that they focus on 
protecting the feelings of a group rather than regulating actions or behavior that would limit 
an individual’s or the group’s right to believe and practice religion as they choose. Id. 
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limitation on the right of expression. This Section first gives a brief 
sampling of such statutes and their enforcement in OIC member 
States, and then explores them in non-member States.175 
1. OIC member States 
 a. Afghanistan. Afghanistan takes a strong stance against 
blasphemy and even allows death sentences to those who violate its 
blasphemy laws. Journalist Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh was sentenced 
to death after being found guilty of blasphemy.176 Kambakhsh was 
arrested after fellow university students complained that he was 
mocking Islam and the Qur’an and that he had circulated an article 
stating that Mohammad failed to enforce women’s rights.177 
Reportedly, Kambakhsh confessed to blasphemy and upon his 
sentencing, the Afghan court threatened arrest for any who protested 
his punishment.178 
 b. Iran. Like Afghanistan, Iran takes a hard stance against 
anything it considers blasphemy. Hashem Aghajari was a university 
professor in Iran when he gave a speech urging the listeners to 
question religious teachings including the words of the clerics, which 
he categorized as part of history rather than sacred writ.179 After 
being found guilty of blasphemy, Aghajari was originally sentenced 
to death, but his charge was later reduced to “insulting religious 
values.”180 He ultimately spent more than two years in prison before 
being released on $122,500.00 bail.181 
 
 175. Because of the difficulty in locating source materials in English from the member 
States, many of these examples are taken from news sources, and the legal reasoning of the 
courts is not always evident. However, this gives a good sampling of the possible abuses by 
governments under the OIC’s defamation of religions theory. Many of these examples were 
first found at http://www.eclj.org/PDF/080623_Recent_Defamation_of_Religion_ 
Incidents_and_Cases.pdf as part of an appendix posted online by the European Centre for Law 
and Justice. 
 176. U.S. Troubled by Afghan Journalist’s Death Sentence, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2536506520080125 (last visted Mar. 27, 2010).  
 177. Id. 
 178. Afghan ‘Blasphemy’ Death Sentence, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7204341.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 179. Iran Frees Professor Set to Die for Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, § 1, at 12. 
 180. Nazila Fathi, Iran Drops Death Penalty for Professor Guilty of Blasphemy, N.Y.TIMES, 
June 29, 2004, at A8. 
 181. Iran Frees Professor Set to Die for Speech, supra note 179, at 12. 
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 c. Pakistan. Pakistan, a leading member of the OIC and the 
country that first submitted a draft resolution on defamation of 
religions, clearly has a history of limiting the fundamental right of 
expression in order to protect the reputation and feelings of Islam, 
but not necessarily other religions. Pakistan’s enforcement of 
blasphemy and defamation laws is extensive and well-documented. 
Punishment for insults against Islam can lead to fines, life 
imprisonment, or a death sentence,182 though no one has been 
officially sentenced to death due to a lack of sufficient evidence in 
Pakistan’s high courts.183 The National Commission for Justice and 
Peace states that 537 people were charged with blasphemy during 
the time period from 1986—when the blasphemy rule was first 
promulgated—through 2003, and sixteen of those accused were 
arbitrarily killed before they appeared in court or were arrested.184 
Additionally, forty-one Christians were killed and ninety-one were 
injured in attacks against Christian (minority) churches.185  
The threat of punishment for blasphemy was enough to shut 
down a nursing school in Islamabad after allegations arose saying 
that verses from the Qur’an posted on a wall had been defaced.186 
Teachers were suspended and students sent away for more than two 
weeks as a precaution.187 Ultimately the trouble was ascribed to 
“invisible hands trying to . . . create disharmony among Muslim and 
Christian students.”188  
 
 182. Pakistan Penal Code, ch. XV, art. 295 (1986), available at http://www. 
punjabpolice.gov.pk/user_files/File/pakistan_penal_code_xlv_of_1860.pdf. 
 183. Pakistan Shuts Nursing College After Blasphemy Scare, REUTERS, June 4, 2007, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINIndia-30139120070604 (last visited Mar. 27, 
2010). 
 184. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities, 10th Sess. 
National Commission for Justice and Peace Letter to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
(Mar. 1, 2004), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/docs/NCJP3a.doc. 
Jagdeesh Kumar’s co-workers allegedly found him guilty of blasphemy and sentenced him to 
die before enforcing the sentence themselves by beating the twenty-year-old to death. Felix 
Qaiser, Mgr Saldanha Slams Murder of Hindu, Killed for Alleged Blasphemy, ASIANEWS.IT Apr. 
9, 2008, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=11971 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 185.  National Commission for Justice and Peace Letter to the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, supra note 184. 
 186. Pakistan Shuts Nursing College After Blasphemy Scare, supra note 183. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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As late as 2008, Robin Sardar, a Christian physician, was charged 
with blasphemy in Hafizabad.189 He was accused of making 
derogatory comments about Mohammed’s beard and the Qur’an.190 
A mob allegedly attacked his home and threatened his life and his 
family; Sardar was then taken into custody.191 He faces the death 
penalty under Pakistan’s penal code.192 
 d. Saudi Arabia. To a lesser degree than Pakistan, perhaps, Saudi 
Arabia still allows preservation of religious feelings to outweigh 
individual right to expression leading to extreme punishments merely 
for holding and expressing an idea. After police received complaints 
of a barber swearing at God in public, Sabri Bogday, age thirty, was 
arrested and sentenced to death after a closed trial in Jeddah.193 He is 
not fluent in Arabic, and was not allowed to have a lawyer or a 
translator during his trial.194  
Mustafa Ibrahim was beheaded in 2007 after being convicted of 
sorcery, adultery, and desecration of the Qur’an195 He was arrested 
under charges of placing the Qur’an in washrooms.196 At the time of 
his arrest there was no mention of adultery or sorcery.197  
Muhammad Al-Harbi, a Saudi high school teacher, was accused 
by his students and fellow teachers of mocking Islam while showing 
favoritism for Jews and Christians.198 The students that accused him 
had recently failed a test administered by Al-Harbi and he had 
 
 189. Persecution.org, Muslims Want Christian Doctor Hanged Publicly for “Blasphemy” in 
Pakistan, May 14, 2008, http://www.persecution.org/suffering/ICCnews/newsdetail. 
php?newscode=7737 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Pakistan Penal Code, supra note 182, art. 295-C (“Use of derogatory remarks, etc., 
in respect of the Holy Prophet: Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the 
sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with 
death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”). 
 193. Amnesty International Doc. MDE 23/014/2008 (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www. 
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE23/014/2008/en/224d8f74-115a-11dd-a414-a101e24 
af105/mde230142008eng.pdf. (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Saudi Executes Egyptian for Practising ‘Witchcraft’, REUTERS, Nov. 2, 2007, 
http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL02434180.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Ebtihal Mubarak, Teacher Charged with Mocking Religion Sentenced to Jail, ARAB 
NEWS, Nov. 14, 2005, http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=73171 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
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refused to allow them to retake the exam.199 Additionally, Al-Harbi 
had allegedly advocated against terrorism—an action that offended 
the fundamentalist students in his classrooms.200 Al-Harbi was 
arrested and sentenced to three years in prison and fifty lashes a week 
for fifteen weeks to be administered in the public market of Al-
Bikeriya. At trial, Al-Harbi’s lawyer was not acknowledged as such, 
and Al-Harbi was not allowed to question his accusers, nor call any 
witnesses.201  
 e. Sudan. In the Sudan, the reach of these limitations of 
expressions extends severe punishment even to those who are 
unaware that their words or actions are in any way offensive, let 
alone defamatory or blasphemous. British School teacher, Gillian 
Gibbons, was arrested by “men with big beards . . . saying they 
wanted to kill her” and imprisoned for blasphemy after allowing her 
primary school class to name a teddy bear Mohammed.202 She faced 
public lashing, or up to six months in jail if she was found guilty.203 
Within a month, she had been sentenced to prison but granted a 
presidential pardon, largely due to the intervention of two British 
Muslim parliamentarians.204 
In these brief examples from OIC member States, the problems 
inherent in the defamation of religions theory are clear. Because 
there is no line drawn between acceptable speech that may seem 
insulting or offensive speech that actually leads to discrimination or 
incitement against the targeted religion, and because the 
defamatory—in these cases blasphemous—nature of the expression is 
judged not by the action that results but by a per se standard 
(meaning if the prohibited expression happens, it is blasphemous and 
thereby punishable) there is a broad range of “permissible” 
limitations on the freedom of expression so as to preserve the 
majority religion’s freedom from religious injury. This effect can be 
seen in non-member States as well, including some Western States. 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Rob Crilly, The Blasphemous Teddy Bear, TIME, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www. 
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1687755,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Sam Dealey, The Teddy Bear Tumult’s Legacy, TIME, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www. 
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1690280,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
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2. Non-member States  
 a. India. The Indian government has demonstrated a willingness 
to ban written works rather than defend authors from serious 
personal threats. Well-known author Talima Nasreem was forced to 
flee her home country of Bangladesh after publication of her book, 
Shame, when Muslim extremists made her into the object of threats 
and unofficial death sentences. Nasreem initially resorted to heavy 
security but eventually went into exile. Officially, her government 
banned her writings, claiming they could “hurt the people’s religious 
sentiments,” stopped imports of magazines carrying her poems, and 
sentenced her to one year in prison for “writing derogatory 
comments about Islam.”205 Even these government actions, which 
do not rise to the threat of long-term imprisonment or death, still 
demonstrate a willingness to protect against religious defamations 
rather than other human rights.  
 b. Italy. Even in Europe, States have demonstrated a willingness 
to protect the sentiments of a religion by prosecuting an author for 
written works deemed offensive. A well-known Italian author, 
Oriana Fallaci faced charges of “outrage” toward religion. The 
president of the Muslim Union of Italy accused her by saying the 
book in question was “offensive to Islam and Muslims,” and argued 
that it incited religious hatred.206 Fallaci defended her writing, 
responding that she had “expressed [her] opinion through the 
written word through [her] books, that is all.”207 She was living in 
the United States at the time and did not travel to Italy to appear in 
court.208 She died just three months after the trial began. 
 c. Canada. Canada has also rejected the United States’ very 
broad protection of speech, choosing instead to allow criminal 
punishment for “hate propaganda,” including statements that tend 
to produce hateful feelings towards an identifiable group.209 
 
 205. Talima Nasreen: Controvery’s Child, BBC NEWS, Nov. 23, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7108880.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 206. Islam “Defamation” Trial Delayed, WORLD NET DAILY, June 14, 2006, http:// 
www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50636 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 207. Italian Author to be Tried for Defaming Islam, JERUSALEM POST, June 12, 2006, 
http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=24604 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 208. Islam “Defamation” Trial Delayed, supra note 206. 
 209. Canadian Criminal Code § 319, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/C-
46/20091128/page-0.html?rp2=HOME&rp3=SI&rp1=hate&rp4=all&rp9=cs&rp10=L&rp 
13=50#idhit1 (making public statements that incite hatred against an identifiable group and 
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Additionally, Canada openly advocates limits to the right of 
expression.210 In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld a 
criminal conviction of a teacher for “unlawfully promoting hatred 
against an identifiable group by communicating anti-Semitic 
statements to his students.”211 The Court found that in his classes, 
the teacher had described Jews as “treacherous,” “communists,” 
“manipulative,” and “deceptive.”212 The teacher also taught that 
Jews as a people were “sadistic,” “barbaric,” “money-loving,” and 
“power hungry.”213 Chief Justice Brian Dickson noted that the 
“relationship between Canadian and American approaches to the . . . 
protection of free expression”214 was important to the case, but 
concluded that, although “there is much to be learned from First 
Amendment jurisprudence [in the United States],”215 
the international commitment to eradicate hate propaganda and, 
most importantly, the special role given equality and 
multiculturalism in the Canadian Constitution necessitate a 
departure from the view . . . that the suppression of hate 
propaganda is incompatible with the guarantee of free 
expression.216 
Canadian Human Rights jurisprudence also supports the OIC’s 
assertions that Islam needs singular protection against defamatory 
speech and that limitations on the right of expression are justified by 
a right not to be offended. Mohamed Elmsary, a Canadian Muslim 
and President of the Canadian Islamic Conference, brought suit 
 
which are likely to create a breach of the peace a criminal offense punishable by up to two years 
in prison; making any statement, other than those made in private conversation, that “willfully 
promotes hatred against any identifiable group” a criminal offense punishable by up to two 
years in prison; and providing a defense to such offenses if the person can establish the truth of 
the statements, if the statements were made in a good faith argument to assert a religious 
opinion or belief, if the person had reasonable ground to believe the statements were true and 
engaged in a discussion for the public benefit, or if the person was acting in good faith to point 
out matters “producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group 
in Canada”).  
 210. Id. 
 211. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, (Can.), available at http://csc.lexum. 
umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990scr3-697/1990scr3-697.pdf. 
 212. Id. at 104. 
 213. Id.  
    214. Id. at 46. 
    215. Id. at 51. 
 216. Id.  
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against Mark Steyn claiming the publication of Steyn’s work in a 
magazine was discriminatory, defamatory, and thereby prohibited by 
Canadian hate law statutes.217 The Ontario Human Rights 
Commission did not proceed with the complaint because the 
Ontario Human Rights Code (the “OHRC”) does not grant the 
Commission jurisdiction over complaints about periodical content. 
However, the Commission did express concern that “Islamophobic 
attitudes are becoming more prevalent in society and Muslims are 
increasingly the target of intolerance” and that Steyn’s writings as 
published were one example of this.218 The Commission went on to 
“strongly condemn the targeting of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians 
and . . . any racialized community by the media as being inconsistent 
with the [OHRC].”219 The Commission ultimately recognized that 
freedom of expression is important to democracy, has social value, 
and contributes to self-fulfillment and the pursuit of truth, but 
warned that  
with rights come responsibilities. . . . [T]he media has a 
responsibility to engage in fair and unbiased journalism. Bias 
includes . . . prejudicial attitudes towards individuals and 
groups . . . . Freedom of expression should be exercised through 
careful reporting and not used as a guise to target vulnerable 
groups and to further increase the marginalization or stigmatization 
in society.220 
Finally, the Commission reiterated that freedom of expression is a 
limited, rather than an absolute right, noting that one such 
limitation can be found in the Canadian Criminal Code provision on 
hate speech.221  
 d. The United Kingdom. David Wilson was charged with 
distributing “written material which is threatening, abusive or 
 
 217. ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, COMPLAINT NO. LHOR-72JP9D 
http://www.steynonline.com/images/macleans%20hr%20on%20elmasry.pdf (last visited Mar. 
27, 2010). 
 218. Ontario Human Rights Commission, COMMISSION STATEMENT CONCERNING 
ISSUES RAISED BY COMPLAINTS AGAINST MACLEAN’S MAGAZINE, http://www.ohrc.on.ca 
/en/resources/news/statement (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 219. Id. (emphasis added). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.; see also Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 209.  
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insulting [with the intent] to stir up racial hatred”222 under sections 
17 and 19 of the Public Order Act of 1986.223 The lower tribunal 
found that, within a community, Wilson had delivered leaflets that 
were threatening, were likely to provoke fear, had racist overtones, 
and contained insulting, abusive, and inaccurate information that was 
an affront to the dignity of Muslims in the community and likely to 
cause a breach of the peace.224 Wilson appealed his conviction, 
claiming that the tracts he distributed were political tracts not 
containing abusive material.225 Additionally, he argued that section 
17 of the Public Order Act focused on racial hatred and that such 
hatred had to be defined as against a group distinguished by color, 
race, nationality, ethnic, or national origins.226 His request for appeal 
was refused and the court concluded that, as to the first question, 
Wilson failed to provide any evidence to refute the lower court’s 
finding that the leaflet was threatening and so the initial finding was 
affirmed. As to Wilson’s distinction between race and religion, the 
court sided with the lower court and held that the determination of 
whether a group fits in the definition of the act is a question of fact 
and that, in this case, the lower tribunal found that the terms 
“Pakistani” and “Muslim” were commonly used interchangeably.227 
Thus, the leaflets “were abusive to persons defined by reference to 
national origins and also colour” and were not a permissible 
expression under the Act.228  
 e. The United States. The United States affords strong protection 
to speech, even speech that is hateful, offensive, or threatening. 
Critics believe that the United States is far too lenient in the amount 
and type of speech protected under constitutional standards. For 
example, as noted above, although incitement falls outside the 
category of protected speech, in order for speech to qualify as 
incitement under First Amendment jurisprudence, it must be both 
intended to incite or produce imminent lawless action and likely to 
 
 222. Wilson v. Procurator Fiscal, [2005] J.C. 97, available at http://www.bailii.org/ 
scot/cases/ScotHC/2005/HCJAC_97.html. 
 223. See Public Order Act, 1986, c.64 (Eng.), available at http://www.statutelaw.gov. 
uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=2236942. 
 224. Wilson, J.C. 97, ¶ 4. 
    225. Id. ¶ 12. 
 226. Id.; see also Public Order Act, supra note 223. 
 227. Wilson, J.C. 97, ¶ 15. 
 228. Id.  
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incite or produce such an action.229 This strong protection of speech 
was demonstrated when Saad Noah filed suit in the U.S. District 
Court of the Eastern District of Virginia against AOL Time Warner 
asking for damages and injunctive relief because AOL failed to 
prohibit anti-Islamic comments and insults in online chat rooms.230 
In his complaint, Noah listed more than twenty pages of vulgar 
insults, disrespectful epithets, and violent threats he had suffered 
from other AOL members while visiting Islam and Qur’an chat 
rooms.231 The case was dismissed on the grounds that Noah, acting 
pro se, was not capable to represent others’ claims in a class action 
suit. However, the court held that Noah’s claim as to himself failed 
on all three legal theories Noah asserted. Importantly, Noah had no 
claim as to hate speech, blasphemy, or defamation, as no such laws 
exist in the United States. He also did not have a First Amendment 
free speech claim because, though the government in the United 
States is permitted to regulate incitement, it is not required to 
regulate incitement, and, in this case, there was no attempt at such 
government regulation.  
The wide spectrum of current treatment of statements and 
actions that fall under the defamation of religions theory is evident 
even in the small sampling of instances above. From the liberal 
protection of freedom of expression under the First Amendment to 
the liberal punishment of even inadvertent offenses against Islam in 
the OIC member States like Pakistan, the range of possible 
interpretations and application of defamation of religions is almost 
unlimited and endows state actors with an enormous power of 
regulation and enforcement.  
In addition to these examples, scholars and professionals have 
put forth numerous possible applications of defamation of religions, 
which pose increasing danger to the right of expression and 
increasing authority for tyrannical governments that would silence 
dissenters and for majoritarian religions that would infringe on 
others’ rights to exercise their beliefs through witnessing and 
teaching. 
 
 229. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 230. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 231. Complaint, Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, (E.D. Va. 
2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aoltimewarner/noahaol83001 
cmpt.pdf. 
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D. Possible Future Statutes and Enforcement Under Defamation of 
Religions Theory 
Adoption of the theory of defamation of religions as created by 
the OIC and proliferated in continuing U.N. Resolutions will allow 
enlarging the limitations on the right of expression—a discriminatory 
act in and of itself that is “the handmaiden of power [and] an 
instrument to assist in the attainment, preservation or continuance 
of . . . power, whether exercised by an individual, an institution, or a 
state. It is the extension of physical power into the realm of the mind 
and the spirit.”232  
As late as November of 2008, a meeting on the “Culture of 
Peace” requested by Saudi Arabia and hosted by the U.N. was 
criticized by the chair of the U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom as being “a cooperative effort between Muslim 
nations to reinforce the defamation of religion resolution they’re 
sponsoring before the General Assembly ” and “part of an attempt to 
legitimatize sharia law . . . . acting as a shield for countries that 
persecute any insult to Islam and intimidate Western nations that 
may attempt to criticize them.”233 
This extension of power would reach new heights as States 
would be assuming responsibility to determine what type of 
expression qualifies as blasphemous or defamatory to religion as 
opposed to non-violative expression. This is obviously problematic in 
countries with a recognized state religion because of the danger to 
the limits of the rights of minority religions, but this venture into 
defining the indefinable is also dangerous in pluralistic countries with 
mostly secular, democratic governments. For example, the Danish 
government would be forced to decide what, if anything, might be 
defamatory or insulting to Islam in the now infamous cartoons. This 
is a nearly impossible task, and it opens the door to major abuses of 
discretion by governments that could limit expression in the name of 
protecting a religion or set of beliefs from offense. 
 
 232. Agnes Callamard, Conference Room Paper, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Expert Seminar on the Links Between Articles 19 and 20 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 (quoting Michael Scammell, Censorship and its 
History—A Personal View, 1988 Article 19 World Report 5). 
 233. Jennifer Lawinski, FOX NEWS, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,448104,00.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
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Moreover, risks are high that accidental defamers will commit 
their crimes unawares. For example, advertisements and marketing 
leading up to the 2010 World Cup have offended some Muslims. 
The Council of Muslim Theologians of South Africa stated that 
souvenir soccer balls with images of the flags of Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and Iraq, which include Islamic statements that Muslims hold as 
sacred, “[have] the potential of offending adherents of the Islamic 
faith.”234 Though it is possible that no offense was intended or even 
foreseen, this act could be made punishable under the broad concept 
of defamation of religions. The U.N. must look for a more legitimate 
way to sensitively address the injustices suffered by multiple religious 
adherents and encourage actions to create an atmosphere of dialogue 
with respect and thus protect the freedom of expression as well as the 
freedom to believe and practice religion. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS IN THE U.N. 
RESOLUTIONS 
Attempts to define an alternative to the OIC resolutions on 
defamation of religions require a careful look at the interests to be 
balanced—namely, the right to hold and express an opinion on one 
side balanced against the desire to encourage a respectful dialogue 
and eliminate discriminatory expressions and action on the other. 
The appropriate standard should include a notion of incitement that 
is considerably broader than the current U.S. standard, but that is 
narrow enough to allow for some regulation, possibly even 
criminalization. However, the standard cannot be so broad as to 
eliminate robust discussion that sometimes shocks and offends.  
Some assert that the United States’ First Amendment 
jurisprudence is the proper model and should be summarily adopted 
by the international legal community.235 This approach is overly 
simplistic, ignores the pluralistic nature of international law, and is 
overtly imperialistic. It is short-sighted and fails to acknowledge 
compelling interests in preventing massacres like the Holocaust or 
Rwanda, which many scholars determine were rooted first in hateful 
 
 234. Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Cultural and Social Affairs Department 
OIC Islamophobia Observatory, MONTHLY BULLETIN—Nov. 2008, at 1(c), http://www.oic-
oci.org/english/article/MB_Nov-08.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 235. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 144; Groves, supra note 39. 
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or inciting speech.236 As noted above, no other country has 
embraced the broad protections that the United States provides 
pursuant to its First Amendment jurisprudence. Assertions, then, 
that this should be adopted without question as the international 
standard for freedom of expression appear inherently flawed. At the 
same time, the broad protections against defamation of religions 
proposed by the OIC and its member states impermissibly infringe 
on the basic human right of freedom to hold autonomous opinions 
and freedom to express those opinions as well as the freedom to 
exercise religious mandates to witness one’s beliefs to others. 
In response to the conflict between these important interests, the 
U.N. should follow the recommendation made by the Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia, and related intolerance and move away from the 
“sociological notion of the defamation of religions” and toward the 
established “human rights concept of incitement to racial and 
religious hatred,”237 thus coming closer to an appropriate balance 
between freedom of expression and the need to eliminate hate 
speech.238 Any permissible limitations under Article 19 of the ICCPR 
“should be clearly and narrowly defined” so as to be the “least 
intrusive means” of limiting expression and should not be allowed to 
justify prior censorship on speech,239 thus encouraging a robust 
debate within the community. This “free flow of information [will 
increase] the capacity of all to participate” in the nation or 
community and contribute to the understanding of law and policy 
 
 236. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 
MCGILL L.J. 144 (2000) (“Mugesera himself did not commit genocide, although his speech 
sparked a series of atrocities directed against Tutsi in the Gisenyi region of the country. . . . 
[H]is remarks constituted direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Mugesera’s 
speech has been cited . . . as one of the defining moments in the buildup to genocide. The 
road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech.”). 
 237. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action ¶ 5, (July 1, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-38_E.pdf. 
 238. Id. ¶ 19. 
 239.  U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 65, (Mar. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/7session/A-HRC-7-
14.pdf. 
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therein.240 Though this standard may conflict with Islamic religious 
requirements, it is not equitable that one group should have basic 
rights categorically enforced at the expense of others’ equally 
fundamental human rights. In order for all to enjoy and exercise 
such basic rights, all must endure occasional encroachments by those 
who do not share their beliefs, so long as such encroachments do not 
reach a level of actual incitement to violence. 
Rather than encouraging the vague defamation of religions 
theory as asserted by the OIC, thereby allowing States broad 
limitations on expression, the U.N. should encourage sufficiently 
narrow limitations on speech that can include regulation and even 
criminalization for incitement or hate speech. Ideally, statutory 
regulations would provide protection for individuals rather than for 
ideas and would lean toward punishing actions rather than 
expressions of ideas or opinions. Thus, an expression may seem 
offensive to the Islamic religion as a whole, but only an individual 
who experiences the effects of violence or discrimination or who 
would suffer the effects of violence or discrimination were it carried 
out could make a claim. This would do away with the shapeless 
victim or plaintiff of “a religion.” For example, a statute may require 
that the speaker or publisher intend that his or her expression will 
lead to discriminatory actions or exclusions of another individual 
based on some type of classification—be it racial, ethnic, or religious. 
Another way to limit the limitations on expression might be to 
provide that the audience has to demonstrate intent to act on the 
inciting expression. Obviously, there will be some balancing involved 
regardless of the standard adopted because determining a hard-line 
rule for what type of speech incites hatred or discrimination is a 
nearly impossible task without considering the speaker, the audience, 
and the circumstances of the speech or speech act. However, with 
good principles and reliance on established international legal 
foundations, a narrower protection can be enforced that will avoid 
indiscriminate infringement of the essential freedom to hold and 
express autonomous ideas and opinions.  
 
 240. Agnes Callamard, Conference Room Paper #2, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r 
for Human Rights, Expert Meeting on the Links Between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR: 
Freedom of Expression and Advocacy of Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to 
Discrimination, Hostility or Violence, (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/experts_papers.htm. 
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Additionally, the U.N. must encourage that such statutes be 
designed to protect all religions from expressions that incite hatred 
or violence regardless of whether countries embrace a state religion 
and regardless of what that state religion is. States can thereby avoid 
favoring one group or sect over another and allow all to practice and 
contribute equally. Thus, countries will most likely encourage 
discussion in a respectful and civil atmosphere while avoiding “the 
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion” that could 
ultimately lead to “the [lost] opportunity of exchanging error for 
truth [or] the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, 
produced by its collision with error.”241 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The legal theory of “Defamation of Religions” is a vague, 
overbroad principle designed to provide protection specifically for 
Islam and to allow Islamic nations to impermissibly limit the 
expressions of others within their countries. The U.N. should not 
continue to adopt the resolutions on defamation of religions as they 
encourage overbroad statutes giving governments the power to 
arbitrarily decide what constitutes defamation and should therefore 
be regulated or even criminalized. The negative effects of such 
broad-reaching statues have already been demonstrated in multiple 
countries.  
Rather than encourage the promulgation of defamation of 
religions legislation, the U.N. must use established international law 
principles and guidelines of incitement to discrimination and 
violence to encourage States to enforce religious rights, limit 
discrimination, and create an atmosphere of mutual respect through 
a suitably narrow notion of incitement that will allow some 
regulation and even criminalization, but that will continue to allow 
robust discussion that sometimes shocks and offends.  
The motives behind the promulgation of the defamation of 
religions theory likely include an honest desire to prevent the type of 
discriminatory treatment Muslims have endured in multiple areas of 
the world. However, sufficient protection can be afforded to 
individuals without embracing a doctrine that is so broad that it 
substantially threatens the human right of freedom of expressions. It 
 
 241. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 21 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1998) (1869). 
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is imperialistic and inappropriate to suggest that the international 
legal community should merely adopt U.S. First Amendment 
jurisprudence as the model for the U.N. guidance on the matter. 
There may be broader impositions on expressions internationally 
than would be permissible in the United States, but limitations 
should be based on protecting individuals rather than religions and 
should be narrowly defined to avoid overbroad legislation that could 
be nothing more than a tool for governments with state religions to 
quash ideas with which they do not agree. Only then will we be able  
[t]o maintain international peace and security, . . . [t]o develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, . . . [t]o achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems . . . 
[and to] promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.242 
Allison G. Belnap 
 
 
 242. U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 1–3. 
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